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Political inequality is a major issue in American politics, with racial minorities and low-income voters receiving less favorable representation. Scholars argue that this political inequality stems largely from differences in political participation and that if all citizens participated equally we would achieve political equality. Daniel M. Butler shows that this common view is incorrect. He uses innovative field and survey experiments involving public officials to show that a significant amount of bias in representation traces its roots to the information, opinions, and attitudes that politicians bring to office and suggests that even if all voters participated equally, there would still be significant levels of bias in American politics because of differences in elite participation. Butler's work provides a new theoretical basis for understanding inequality in American politics and insights into what institutional changes can be used to fix the problem

Candidates face a trade‐off in the general election between taking a more‐moderate position that appeals to swing voters and a more‐extreme position that appeals to voters in the party's base. The threat of abstention by voters in the party's base if their candidate takes a position too moderate for them moves candidates to take more‐extreme positions. I discuss hypotheses regarding how this trade‐off affects candidate positioning and describe my tests of those hypotheses using data on House members in the 107th Congress and Senate members for the period 1982–2004. I then present data on how the distribution of voters in the electorate has changed over the past three decades and discuss how, in light of my empirical findings, these changes might explain the observed pattern of asymmetric polarization in Congress in recent decades.

We examine compensation as a tool to encourage the thoughtful use of audit experimentation. If researchers had to compensate subjects or communities, they would be more likely to avoid excessively large studies and to only conduct high-value studies. We build on Desposato and propose that when conducting an audit study, (1) researchers donate time or money to the communities potentially affected by the study, (2) researchers preregister this donation, and (3) researchers provide evidence of the donation they made in publication and presentation.

AbstractThis paper discusses how audit studies can be adapted to test the effectiveness of interventions aimed at reducing discrimination. We conducted an adapted audit experiment to test whether making officials aware of bias could reduce levels of racial bias. While the limitations of our design make it difficult to assess where information alone can reduce bias, our study makes two important contributions. First, we replicate prior studies by showing that white, local elected officials are less responsive to black constituents. That local officials exhibit biased behavior is particularly worrisome, as local government is often the level that most directly affects citizens' daily lives. Second, we provide several suggestions for future audit studies that draw from the strengths and weaknesses of our own design. We hope that they will help improve future work on identifying and reducing discrimination.

Researchers studying discrimination and bias frequently conduct experiments that use racially distinctive names to signal race. The ability of these experiments to speak to racial discrimination depends on the excludability assumption that subjects' responses to these names are driven by their reaction to the individual's putative race and not some other factor. We use results from an audit study with a large number of aliases and data from detailed public records to empirically test the excludability assumption undergirding the use of racially distinctive names. The detailed public records allow us to measure the signals about socioeconomic status and political resources that each name used in the study possiblycouldsend. We then reanalyze the audit study to see whether these signals predict legislators' likelihood of responding. We find no evidence that politicians respond to this other information, thus providing empirical support for the excludability assumption.